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The aim of this paper is to explain under which circumstances using TACs as instrument to manage
a ￿shery along with ￿shing periods may be interesting from a regulatory point of view. In order to
do this, the deterministic analysis of Homans and Wilen (1997) and Anderson (2000) is extended to
a stochastic scenario where the resource cannot be measured accurately. The resulting endogenous
stochastic model is numerically solved for ￿nding the optimal control rules in the Iberian sardine
stock. Three relevant conclusions can be highligted from simulations. First, the higher the uncer-
tainty about the state of the stock is, the lower the probability of closing the ￿shery is. Second, the
use of TACs as management instrument in ￿sheries already regulated with ￿shing periods leads to:
i) An increase of the optimal season length and harvests, especially for medium and high number
of licences, ii) An improvement of the biological and economic variables when the size of the ￿ eet is
large; and iii) Eliminate the extinction risk for the resource. And third, the regulator would rather
select the number of licences and do not restrict the season length.
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Since Homans and Wilen (1997) seminal paper, endogenous ﬁsheries management literature
considers that the regulatory process is divided into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a target
harvest quota is chosen to ensure the stock safety. In the second stage, managers choose
one instrument to achieve the harvest target. Season length is the instrument analyzed by
Homans and Wilen in his article. Anderson (2000) expands this analysis by incorporating
disaggregated vessel behavior and comparing the eﬀects of the use of trip limits or aggregate
quotas with ﬁshing periods. He shows that the same harvest target can be implemented
using diﬀerent “pure” strategies based on the use of only one instrument.
However, ﬁshery management agencies regulate the real world using simultaneously a
mix of instruments: gear restrictions, minimum sizes, area closures, ﬁshing periods (season
length) and total allowed catches (TAC) by areas or individual vessel quotas (IVQ). For
instance, the International Paciﬁc Halibut Commission establishes ﬁshing periods for each
regulatory area of the ﬁshery and the TAC of halibut to be taken during ﬁshing periods for
all areas (IPHC, 2009). Each area will be closed when the TAC is taken or the ﬁshing period
is over. In the same way, the European Commission also controls the number of ﬁshing
days together with other eﬀort control measures since the year 2000 (see EC Regulation
43/2009).
The aim of this paper is to explain under which circumstances using TACs as instrument
to manage a ﬁshery along with ﬁshing periods may be interesting from a regulatory point
of view. For answering this question we extend the deterministic analysis of Homans and
Wilen (1997) and Anderson (2000) to a stochastic scenario where the resource cannot be
measured accurately (Clark and Kirkwood, 1986). In our model the regulatory process also
is divided into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a target harvest is chosen by the regulator.
However, unlike Homans and Wilen (1997), we assume that ﬁshery’s manager does not know
the real state of the stock when target harvest is ﬁxed. As in Clark and Kirkwood (1986)
this stock uncertainty arises from inaccurate stock estimations. In the second stage, daily
quotas (or trip limits), ﬁshing periods (the overall limits on the ﬁshing season) and TACs
can be simultaneously used as instruments for achieving the target harvest.
Following Anderson (2000), we also include a disaggregated vessel analysis and intra-
seasonal stock dynamics. We introduce a stochastic variable, the daily ﬁshing opportunities
or “luck”, for reproducing the observed heterogeneity both in the daily harvest and the days
per season at the vessel level. In particular, we consider that individual vessels choose each
day, after observing the realization of the daily ﬁshing opportunity, either to participate
or not in the ﬁshery. The participating vessel selects the daily use of its capacity. Vessels
1may change capacity between seasons based on expected net returns over the future season.
Finally, we allow vessels to exit. Neither the ﬁshery’s manager nor individual vessels know
the real state of the stock when exit and capacity decisions are taken. However, the real
state of the stock is learned once the season starts.
The ﬁshery management problem is solved taking into account intra and inter seasons
individual vessels decisions. Managers commit to control rules that implement the opti-
mal harvest target policy taking into account the expected future response of the industry.
This response depends, all else equal, on the speciﬁc combination of instruments chosen to
implement the harvest target. In this sense, the model generates individual vessel behav-
ior endogenously, as a function of the state variables and the policy instruments. Taking
into consideration this optimal individual agents’ behavior, we ﬁnd the optimal control rule
used by the ﬁshery manager for selecting the ex-ante target harvest. In this sense, our ﬁsh-
ery management problem can be considered an endogenous stochastic optimization problem
which can be computed numerically1.
The model is used to compare the relative advantage of two diﬀerent management
regimes: Management regimes that combine season length and daily individual quotas; and
Management regimes that combine season length, daily individual quotas and TACs. We
found, that, by introducing uncertainty in a endogenous model we contribute to show that
instruments that are equivalent in a determinist endogenous model reveal operational diﬀer-
ences under uncertainty. TACs and ﬁshing periods are not equivalent. In particular, in our
model the “attempted” ex-ante harvest target and the true ex-post harvest implemented by
using ﬁshing periods will be diﬀerent because both, the number of days each vessel decides
to participate in the ﬁshery and the intensity of use of the individual capacity, depend on
the real state of the stock. The magnitude of this deviation, all else equal, is increasing in
the stock size.
Therefore, combining TACs with ﬁshing periods is not superﬂuous in uncertainty scenario.
If the management regime introduces TACs, the ex-post harvest deviation will be truncated
at a maximum. Regardless of the real state of the resource, harvest cannot be greater than
the ex-ante harvest target because the ﬁshery is closed when the TAC is taken (or the ﬁshing
period is over). We found that the combination of both instruments always reaches higher
expected escapements. Moreover, if the number of vessels is large enough and the ﬁshery is
regulated without TACs, extinction is feasible.
1As Arnason (2000) points out endogenous optimization ﬁsheries models can provide the necessary link
between realistic ﬁsheries management measures and the development of the ﬁshery. Moreover, with the
great progress in numerical computing speed, the practical use of this class of models has become feasible.
2Another interesting feature of our model is that under inaccurate stock estimations
and large number of vessels, combining eﬀort control (ﬁshing periods) with harvest con-
trol (TACs) is the best regulatory choice. However, with small number of vessels eﬀort
control (ﬁshing periods) without harvest control is the best regulatory choice.
This result extends previous ﬁndings in ﬁsheries instrument choice under uncertainty lit-
erature (see Hannesson and Steinshamn, 1991; Quiggin, 1992; Danielsson, 2002; and Kompas
et al, 2008). In this literature it is assumed that there exits two (independent) sources of
uncertainty: uncertainties on the stock recruitment relationship and uncertainty on the catch
eﬀort relationship. The optimal instrument depends on the relative size (the variance) of
each of the uncertainties sources. Danielsson (2002) ﬁnds that, in a single period model, the
greater the variability in the catch-eﬀort relationship relative to the stock recruitment is, the
greater the comparative advantage of harvest controls relative to eﬀort controls is. Kompas
et al. (2008) extend Danielssons’ results into a fully optimal dynamic model.
Our results show that the relative size of the (variance) of each type of uncertainty is an
endogenous variable induced by the regulatory regime. The greater the number of vessels
(licenses) and the trip limit are, the greater the variance of variability in the catch-eﬀort
relationship relative to the stock recruitment is, and therefore, the greater the comparative
advantage of combining harvest controls (TACs) with eﬀort controls (ﬁshing periods and
trip limits) is.
Why combining instruments is the best choice when uncertainty arises from inaccurate
stock estimations? The answer already is in the ﬁshery management under uncertainty lit-
erature. Reed (1979) found that when stock uncertainty comes from the stock recruitment
relationship, the optimal policy is to allow a constant-escapement every period and extinc-
tion never occurs. Clark and Kirkwood (1986) show that when managers cannot perfectly
measure current stock the optimal policy is no longer the constant-escapement rule and ex-
tinction is possible. Sethi et al. (2005) compare both policies. They show that the main
diﬀerence between constant-escapement and the (ﬁrst best) optimal policy, is that, while
constant-escapement calls for large catches when measured stock is large, the optimal policy,
in order to avoid extinction, advocates higher escapement (lower catches) for large stock
measurement. That is as Sethi et al. claims, “due to the fact that both policies shut the
ﬁshery down at low stock size, one can never get extinction for low ﬁsh stock. However when
stock size is large the potential measurement can be signiﬁcantly larger and if the policy calls
for large catches extinction, is more likely”.
Our stochastic endogenous model can be seen as a framework that studies which instru-
ment combinations allow for implementing optimal policy when i) stock uncertainty arises
3from inaccurate stock estimations and ii) uncertainty on the catch eﬀort relationship is en-
dogenously generated by the individual vessel behavior, as a function of the state variables
and the policy instruments (a Ramsey problem).
When the number of licenses is given, even in the deterministic case, it is not always
possible to implement the ﬁrst best policy. If the number of vessels is high, management
regimes without TACs call for higher catches than the ﬁrst best policy. Moreover, when
the stock size is large the potential measurement can be signiﬁcantly larger and the optimal
ﬁshing periods rules call for longer seasons. Higher stocks also induce vessels both to partic-
ipate more days and to harvest more per day. As a result, escapement is lower than in the
optimal ﬁrst best policy. Moreover, if the number of vessels is large, extinction is possible.
Therefore, for ﬁsheries with a large number of vessels, combining TACs with ﬁshing periods
calls for higher escapements and implement best policies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we build upon Homans and Wilen (1997)
and Anderson (2000) an endogenous stochastic regulated restricted access ﬁshery manage-
ment model. The optimal feedback policy is characterized in section 3. Section 4 shows the
strategy for solving numerically the model applied to the Iberian sardine stock. In Section
5 the results are illustrated. We conclude in Section 6.
2 A regulated restricted access ﬁshery
We build upon Homans and Wilen (1997) and Anderson (2000) an endogenous regulated
restricted access ﬁshery management model. Despite the fact that the number of vessels in
the ﬁshery is given, the overall “industry ﬁshing eﬀort” is an endogenous variable. Individual
vessels adjust its capacity (adjustments in horsepower, length and hold capacity) between
seasons based upon the anticipation of both the biomass level and the regulations set by the
agency. This capacity choice determines the daily ﬁshing amount of individual eﬀort (amount
of labor, fuel, ..) and the number of days each vessel will be in the ﬁshery. Therefore, for
a given season length and a trip limit, we will show that daily ﬁshing eﬀort and the overall
number of ﬁshing days devoted to the ﬁshery by each vessel is an endogenous variable that
depends on the use or not of TACs along with ﬁshing periods.
42.1 Industry behavior
As Anderson (2000) we use a discrete rather than a continuous model. Let us assume that








where subscript d and t denotes day and season, respectively. θ is a catchability parameter,
kt is the individual vessels ﬁshing capacity or power, ed,t is a measure of the daily use of
ﬁshing capacity, Xd,t denotes the biomass, and ξd,t is a stochastic variable that represents
luck and/or ﬁshing opportunities2.
As in Homans and Wilen (1997), and Anderson (2000), individual vessels ﬁshing capacity
or power, kt, is considered variable between seasons but ﬁxed within a season. However, the
daily use of this capacity depends on the stock size, Xd,t and luck, ξd,t. After observing
the daily ﬁshing opportunity, each vessel decides if they operate or not and the daily eﬀort,
ed,t. Moreover, between seasons, each vessel chooses its capacity for the next season and the
regulator select the length season and the TAC, if it is the case, for the next season. Finally,
we allow vessels to exist the ﬁshery. Below we describe the information set available for each
agent at any moment t.
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Within season daily eﬀort choice
Consider that within the season t, the regulator introduces a daily catch limit or trip
limit per vessel, h.3 Further, let wed,t be the daily real variable cost of operation measured
2Vessels may know the daily ﬁshing opportunity before the start of a ﬁshing day analyzing objective vari-
ables such as altimetry and surface currents, sea surface and subsurface temperature, cloudless temperature,
ocean color or location of ocean eddies and fronts. In fact, there are companies which oﬀer ﬁsherman satellite
based services to support ﬁshing.
3As in Anderson (2000) each day of ﬁshing is analogous to a trip.























t Xd,t is given,
where superscript o stands for operating vessel. From the ﬁrst order conditions of this
optimization problem, the daily eﬀort function is obtained to be equal to
ed,t(ξd,t,kt,Xd,t|h) =

   





























Note that, for each day, there exists an upper bound of the daily ﬁshing opportunities,
ξd,t ≥ ξd,t, for which the daily regulator’s restriction aﬀects the daily harvest. Formally, ξd,t





Within season daily participation choice
We also assume that there is a daily ﬁxed cost of operation equal to cf, such that daily








This implies a lower bound of the daily ﬁshing opportunities exists, ξd,t ≥ ξ
d,t, for which it
is optimal not to participate (this day) in the ﬁshery. Formally, ξ
d,t satisﬁes
πd,t(ξ
d,t,kt,Xd,t|h) = (1 − γ)hd,t(ξ







4This daily variable cost, is given by the cost of freezing, the fuel consumption during the use of the gear,
and other running costs.
6Within season stock dynamics and total harvest
We also assume that there exits a license limitation scheme that restricts the access to
the ﬁshery. Let nv be the number of vessels. Then, taking into account the individual daily












where f(ξd,t) is the probability density function of the random variable ξd,t. Notice that we
introduce upper case against lower case notation to distinguish ﬂeet variables from individual
variables, respectively.








where the stock dynamics intra season is given by
Xd+1,t = Xd,t − Hd,t(kt,Xd,t|h,n
v) ∀d = 1,...,Tt, (4)
and the stock size at the beginning of the season, X1,t, is taking as given.
Notice that the shorter the season lenght is the higher the capacity that the vessel has
to mantain to keep the same level of harvest.
Between seasons capacity choice
At the beginning of each season, each vessel selects the capacity that maximizes its




where, Et denotes the expectations at the beginning of season t, pk is the capital rental price





Note that we allow vessels to adjust each season capacity as faster as they want (but inside
the set [k,k]).


























where 1 − φ is the labor share in the season net returns and pk is the capital rental price.




Under regular conditions we expect that shorter season lenghts leads vessels to select higher
capacity to maximize the proﬁts.
The industry welfare and exit decision
Note that the presence of seasonal ﬁxed cost, pkk, implies that vessels can choose to
exit the ﬁshery if they expect a small probability of recovering the ﬁxed cost. Formally, the









W(X1,t,Tt|h) = Etπ(kt,X1,t,Tt)|h) − pkkt + βW(X1,t+1,Tt+1|h).
When the optimal decision is to exit, vessels adopt the criterion that exit(St−1,Tt|h) = 1.
W(X1,t,Tt|h) can be interpreted as the value of the vessel i or the licence price. Since
the ﬂeet is composed by identical vessels, the total welfare industry can be calculated as
nvW(X1,t,Tt|h).
2.2 Regulator behavior and between seasons stock dynamics
We assume that in each season, the growth of the stock is a function of the escapement at
the end of the previous season, St−1, and a random variable which reﬂects uncontrollable
environmental variability, zt,
X1,t = ztG(St−1). (7)
The escapement St−1, is deﬁned as
St−1 = X1,t−1 − Ht−1(kt−1,X1,t−1,Tt−1|ht−1,n
v). (8)
8We assume that the ﬁshery manager observes the total harvest, the daily catches, and the
total number of harvest days of each vessel during the season without error. Therefore
ﬁshery manager enters the new season t knowing the state of the escapement St−1. However,
the manager does not observe zt when establishing the length season, Tt. This implies that
ﬁshery manager decision is based on the expected state of the resource at the beginning of
the season EX1,t = G(St−1).
Selecting TACs or quotas in a deterministic context consist of choosing the total ﬁshery
captures for the season. In particular, for season t the quota is
Qt = Ht(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,n
v).
Moreover, quotas and ﬁshing periods are equivalent whenever both guarantee the same
escapement at the end of the season, St = G(St)−Qt, (see Anderson 2000). However, under
uncertainty, the “attempted” ex-ante harvest
EtHt(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,n
v),
and the true ex-post harvest
Ht(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,n
v),
will diﬀer because the intensity of use of the individual capacity depends on the real state
of the stock, X1,t = ztG(St−1).
We analyze the eﬀects of two types of regulatory bodies in this uncertain framework:
a) Regulatory body I, where the ﬁshery manager does not establish the quota for the
period. In that case, the ﬁshery will be over at Tt and total escapement is given by
St = Xt − Ht(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,n
v).
b) Regulatory body II, where ﬁshery manager establishes the quota,
Qt = EtHt(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,n
v),
for the season. If the quota is reached before the end of the season, then the escapement
is St = X1,t − Qt. However, if the quota is not reached before the end of the season,
the escapement is St = Xt − Ht(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,nv).
Therefore, escapement at the end of the season is the result of individuals’ decisions on
both capacity use and on the number of days they participate in the ﬁshery during the
season, which in turn depends on the regulatory body establishing or not a season quota. In
particular, we show numerically below that investment capacity with a season TAC is lower
than without a season TAC.
93 The Fishery Manager’s Problem
In this section, we present the problem to be solved for the ﬁshery manager. In order to
capture the biological orientation of most real world ﬁsheries regulatory bodies, we assume,
like Homans and Wilen (1997), that managers have a simple goal. In particular we assume
that ﬁshery manager’s objective function is to maximize the discounted future harvest.5
We start assuming that ﬁshery manager knows the real state of the stock. This allows
us to compare optimal policies under each regulatory body with previous literature results
based on deterministic models. We show that considering this objective function, season
lengths are chosen to ensure stock safety. Then, we extend the analysis to an uncertainty
context where the ﬁshery manager does not know the state of the resource.
3.1 Optimal rules without uncertainty
In a deterministic world the ﬁshery manager chooses the length season Tt that maximizes
present value of future catches taking into account stock dynamics (equations (7) and (8)),
the capital implementation condition (equation (5)) and the vessel exit decision (equation
(6)).
The optimal regulation rule can be obtained in two steps as in the Homans and Wilen’
model (2007) if exist a length season Tt that implements any possible quota Qt. In such







s.t. St = G(St−1) − Qt
(9)
and given this quota policy, Q(X1,t) , ﬁshery manager uses the capital implementation con-
dition (5) to ﬁnd the optimal vessel capacity kt. Then the optimal season length, Tt, is the
one that satisﬁes Qt(St−1) = Ht(kt,G(St−1),Tt|h,nv).
The solution of problem (9) is well known in the literature (see Reed 1979) and implies,
in a deterministic world, a constant escapement6. The optimal length season rule Tt(St−1)
5This aim is on the line of the objectives pointed out by the 2002 Johannesburg Summit
where it was established 2015 for depleted stocks achieving the maximum sustainable yield.
6Note that, the problem is equivalent to ﬁnd the optimal escapement trajectory that maximizes
 ∞
t=0 β
t[G(St−1) − St] given the initial condition G(St−1). The Euler equation is equal to 1 = βG′(St),
which is a bang-bang policy, with constant escapement level at the point, S∗, where the inverse of the
discount factor, 1/β, equals the slope of the growth function, G′(S∗).




Tt(St−1) = 0 if G(St−1) < S∗,
Ht(kt,X1,t,Tt|h,nv) = G(St−1) − S∗ if G(St−1) ≥ S∗.
(10)
This optimal rule is a bang-bang policy that consists of closing the ﬁshery if the escapement
is lower than a safety level S∗.
However when it is not feasible to ﬁnd a length season Tt that implements any possible
quota Qt, ﬁshery manager chooses the season length, T(St−1), by solving
V (St−1|h,nv) = max
Tt
Ht(kt,St,Tt|h,n




      
      
∂πt(kt,G(St),Tt|h,nv)
∂kt = pk,
St = G(St) − Ht(kt,G(St−1),Tt|h,nv),
exit(G(St),|h,nv) = 0.
Note that we use dynamic programming (DP) to write the ﬁshery manager’s problem and
that escapement at the end of the previous period is the state variable of the DP equation.
3.2 Optimal rules under uncertainty
Let us start assuming that managers use regulatory body I (no TAC). First, note that as
in Clark and Kirkwood (1986) at the end of each season escapement can be measured with
precision. So ﬁshery manager chooses the season length, T(St−1), by solving the following
DP problem













      





St = ztG(St−1) − Ht(kt,ztG(St−1),Tt|h,nv),
exit(St−1,Tt|h) = 0.
(11)
where f(z) is the probability density of the random variable z. Observe that ﬁshery manager
takes into account that: i) vessels chooses capacity at the beginning of the new season, ii)
11escapement at the end of the season is a function of the random variable, zt, and iii) the
optimal solution must imply the preservation of the ﬂeet.
When TAC’s are used (regulatory body II),
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Note that under regulatory body II, the attempted quota must be consistent with the an-
nounced season length, the trip limit and the industry investment decisions. Finally, note
that when ﬁshery manager uses TACs and ﬁshing periods, sometimes the ﬁshery closes before
the season is over. That is, T c





Finally, under each regulatory body i = I,II, it is necessary to check that each vessel




















      










to check if exiti(St−1,Tt|h) is equal to zero for all St−1 and for the optimal season length
rule, T i(S).
124 Numerical Simulations
In order to illustrate the eﬀects of introducing ex-ante TACs, we apply the model to the
Iberian sardine stock. This stock is located in the European ﬁsheries areas VIIIc and IXa.
European authorities do not ﬁxed management objectives for this stock and there is not TAC.
However, the stock is managed by Portugues and Spanish authorities through minimum
landing size, maximum daily catch, days ﬁshing limitations, and closed areas. Suris (1993)
addresses regulatory policies for this stock in a deterministic contex.
In the following subsections we describe the calibration of the model for the Iberian
sardine stock and the code strategy we follow to simulate the ﬁshery behavior.
4.1 Parameter Values and Functional Forms
For our numerical computation, we adopt the following parameter values and functional
forms:
1. Biological dynamics. As Setthi et al. (2005), we assume a logistic growth function









where r is interpreted as the intrinsic growth rate and L is the carrying capacity of the
resource.
Data from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) data bank
are used for estimating the equation. Following the 2007 ICES assessment, we use the
period 1996-2006.7 The results of the estimation are   r = 1.2097 and   L = 4.5934×105.
Figure 1 illustrates the data and the estimation. The steady state spawner stock
and harvest with β = 0.95 associated with the constant-escapement policy, (S∗ =
  L[(1+  r)−β
−1]/2  r and X∗ = S∗[(1+  r)−(  r/  L)S∗]), are equal to 219,676 and 357,734
Tn respectively. Finally, we assume that zt is an independent, stationary, uniformly
distributed random variable of the following form:
zt = 1 + (2ut − 1)ε
where ut is drawn from a uniform distribution [0,1] and ε is a parameter aﬀecting the
variance of the distribution of z. Since the maximum deviation of the data around the
mean, Xt+1/St
 




, is equal to 40.5%, we decide to ﬁx ε equal to 0.405.
7The Stock assessment made by ICES working group used Indices from the Spanish March survey, covering
Division VIIIc and Subdivision IXaN, and the Portuguese March survey, covering the remainder of Division
IXa, added together without weighting, for the years 1996 to 2007.






































Figure 1: Escapement and Spawner Biomass. Solid line shows the estimated function.
Dotted Lines show the constant-escapement solution in a deterministic context. Dotted
Lines show optimal levels (S∗ =   L[(1 +   r) − (1 + β)]/2  r and X∗ = S∗[(1 +   r) − (  r/  L)S∗]
associated with β = .95,   r = 1.2097 and   L = 4.5934 × 105.
2. Fleet capacity measurement. Sardine is harvested by Spanish and Portuguese
vessels. In northern Spanish waters, sardine is harvested by purse seiners. Half of the
purse seiners (51%) are licensed in Galicia (ICES, 2007, section 8.2.1). We calibrate
the model to reproduce some stylized facts of the Galician sardine ﬂeet. First, we
estimate the daily harvest at vessel level using data on Pesca Galicia8. We construct
a panel data from daily data starting from January 1, 2007 up to October 31, 2008.
Our panel selects vessels that harvest at least 7,000 kilos per season.9 The panel has
15,243 observations from 140 vessels. We estimate the following equation:
loghid = δZi,d + uid
where hid is sardine harvest of vessel i at day d and uid ∽ N(0,σ2
u) represents a time
invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. Zi,d denotes the exogenous variables
vector in which a constant term, the gross register tonnage (GRT), in logs, as a proxy
of the capacity, and monthly and seasonal dummy variables are included. Table 1
shows the estimation results for the parameter vector δ using OLS.10 Observe that we
obtain an elasticity of the capacity equal to 0.98.
8http://www.pescagalicia.com/
97,000 kilos is the daily trip limit of this ﬁshery for the Spanish authorities.
10We have also considered individual horse power, size and vessel length. However, none of these variables
14Table 1: Regression with robust standard errors
ln h Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ln k .9817207 .0101138 97.07 0.000 .9618965 1.001545
year -.1791843 .0226093 -7.93 0.000 -.2235013 -.1348673
dm1 .3299584 .1123548 2.94 0.003 .1097295 .5501873
dm2 .3568161 .1107017 3.22 0.001 .1398275 .5738048
dm3 .0675137 .1174635 0.57 0.565 -.1627287 .2977561
dm4 .3057071 .1097386 2.79 0.005 .0906063 .5208078
dm5 .7237725 .1070695 6.76 0.000 .5139034 .9336415
dm6 .5203433 .1061364 4.90 0.000 .3123033 .7283833
dm7 .2386561 .1062406 2.25 0.025 .0304118 .4469004
dm8 .2601109 .1069127 2.43 0.015 .0505492 .4696725
dm9 .4140819 .1089408 3.80 0.000 .2005449 .627619
dm10 .4912853 .1068017 4.60 0.000 .2819412 .7006294
dm11 .1998815 .1164536 1.72 0.086 -.0283815 .4281446
cons 2.901477 .1086673 26.70 0.000 2.688476 3.114478
Number of obs. = 15243; F( 11, 15231) = 784.24; Prob > F = 0.0000; R2= 0.3605
3. Parameters calibrated from the model.
The ﬁshing opportunity variable, ξ, is assumed to follow a log normal distribution with
Logξ − N(0,σ2
ξ). The parameter σ2
ξ and the boundary values ξ and ξ are calibrated
in such way that the stylized facts of the ﬁshery shown in Table 2, are reproduced.
In particular, these three values can be obtained as the solution of the following three
equation system,
D1 = h


















Notice that the average daily harvest rule, when the ﬂeet harvest less than h, is ex-
pressed as ξh/ξ taking in consideration (??) and (2).
are statistically signiﬁcative. Notice that it only appears a season dummy (year) because we have data from
two seasons.
15Table 2: Fleet stylized facts
D1 = Average harvest per day (Tn) 1.91
D2 = Probability that daily harvest > h 0.99
D3 = % of the average number of operating days per season 0.43
D4 = Elasticity of the capacity 0.98
Once the boundary values ξ and ξ have been calibrated, given a guess of α, the pa-
rameters, cf, θ and γ can be calculated using the deﬁnitions of the boundary of ξ,
equations (2) and (3) and the elasticity of capacity (see equation (1)). That is,








where X = 526,457, k = exp(3.4) and w = 1/0.9 are the 2007 biomass, average GRT
and the average real cost of ﬂeet sample, respectively11. Finally, we use equation (5)
to check if the guess value used for α implements the level of capacity.
Given all the parameters, it is possible to calculate the harvest path and simulate the
stock evolution intra season using the dynamic equation (4). The average value of
the daily harvest, hd,t, and the fractions of restricted days are calculated to mimic the
average data of the ﬁshery along the season. The season length is ﬁxed to reproduce
the total captures of the 130 vessels of the sample. Figure 2 shows the inter and intra
season harvest and stock dynamics for the calibrated parameters.
To close the calibration, we considered a discount factor β = 0.95 which is equivalent
to a discount rate of 5.26%; a trip limit equal to h = 7 Tn which is the value imposed
by the Spanish authorities for the Iberian sardine; a rental capital price equal to pk =
5.25%; [k,k] = [0.85 × 30,1.15 × 30] being 30 the average GRT of the sample, and
a capital share, φ = 0.5. Table 3 summarizes the parameter values used for the
benchmark model.
11Along 2007, sardine prices per day was quite constant around (0.9 euros per kilo).
16Table 3: Model Parameter Calibration
θ daily harvest 1.5241×10−7
γ daily eﬀort returns 0.1138
α capacity returns 0.87
cf daily ﬁx cost 1.1186
σξ ﬁshing daily opportunity 0.7453
h daily trip limit 7
φ owner share 0.5
pk capacity price .10
β discount factor 0,95
r stock growth rate 1.2097
L carrying capacity of the stock 4.5934×105
ǫz stock uncertainty 0.4050





























Figure 2: Intra and inter season dynamics with the calibrated parameters.
174.2 Simulation strategy. Codes
Codes for the simulation of the ﬁshery behavior have been written in Matlab. The simulation
strategy for ﬁnding the optimal rules for the season t follows the next algorithm:
1. A ﬂeet is deﬁned by the number of vessels, nv, the limit trip h and the season length
T.
2. A partition in 52 weeks for the season length T is deﬁned. For any value of the T and
for each possible value of escapement St−1 and the state of the stock zt which implies
a stock X1,t = ztG(St−1), the following actions are done:
(a) The daily harvests and proﬁts functions, hd,t and πd,t, are calculated for any kt
using the value of h.
(b) The daily aggregated harvests, hd,t is calculated for any kt using the value of nv.
(c) The next daily stock is calculated substracting the daily aggregated captures from
the initial stock.
(d) The season proﬁts of each vessel, πt, is calculated adding the proﬁts of the T
weeks in which the season is open.
(e) The investment problem for each vessel is solved at de beginning of the season.
That is kt is calculated using (5) for the associated X1,t, T, nv and h.
(f) The daily aggregated harvests and proﬁts functions, hd,t and πd,t, are recalculated
for the optimal kt obtained from the investment problem.
(g) The season aggregated harvests and proﬁts functions, Ht and Πt, are calculated
from the daily functions.
3. For each combination of nv and h, the optimal season lengths rule in each regime,
T i(St−1), is calculated by solving the corresponding Bellman equation (DP problems
(11) and (12)).
4. Given the optimal season length, individual vessel proﬁts are calculated for the whole
season. Based on this result, each vessel decides to exit or not the ﬁshery by solving
the DP (13). It is veriﬁed that for each regime i, the exit function exit(St−1,Tt|h) is
equal to zero.
5. When a TAC regime is considered, the optimal season length, T II
t , is replaced in the









The model establishes that the optimal season length is a function of the state of the resource
and the combination of policy instruments selected to manage the stock (licences, trip limits
and the use or not of TACs). In this section we present numerical simulations of the model
to show the relationships between the variables.
The simulation results are presented in three parts. First, we present how diﬀerent
combinations of licences and trip limits aﬀect to the optimal season length. Second, we
compare the eﬀect of each regime body in biological and economic terms. And third, we
address the extinction issue.
5.1 The season length rule
Deterministic model
When there is not uncertainty about the state of the resource and there is none additional
implementation restrictions, the optimal harvesting rule consists of constant-escapement.
This implies that the ﬁshery has to be closed whenever X1,t = G(St−1) < S∗. When X1,t =
G(St−1) ≥ S∗ the ﬁshery is open; then the optimal harvested is calculated as H∗
t = G(St−1)−
S∗ and the resource dynamics is given by X1,t+1 = G(X1,t − H∗
t ).
Alternatively, in an endogenous model where vessels take daily decisions, the optimal
season length does depend upon other implementation restrictions. In particular, the optimal
length for season t is a function of the stock for a given number of licences, nv, and the trip
limit, h; that is T ∗
t (Xt,1|nv,h). Once the optimal T ∗
t is selected by the manager, the optimal
total harvests is calculated as H∗
t (kt,X1,t,T ∗











Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal season length varies when the stock and number of
licences change for a trip limit equal to the benchmark value h = 7 in a deterministic scenario
with respect to the stock12. The left panel shows a three dimensional graph with optimal
season length (in weeks) for diﬀerent combinations of stocks and number of vessels. We can
see that as the stock of the resource and the number of licences increase, the optimal season
length increases. In the right panel, we show the combinations of stock and vessels that lead
the ﬁshery to diﬀerent scenarios in terms of closure during the season: i) The ﬁshery never
closes (red color), ii) The ﬁshery is never open during the season (dark blue), iii) The ﬁshery
closes at some moment of the season (light blue). The white dotted line shows the situation

























































the fishery is close
No season closure
Figure 3: Deterministic model with respect to the state of the stock. Left panel:
T(Xt,1,nv|h = 7) rule. Right panel: T rule vs. free escapement rule (white dotted line)
of constant-escapement; below (above) the dotted line the constant-escapement rule would
imply the closure (openness) of the ﬁshery. The results are quite intuitive. When the stock
is high and the number of licences is low, the ﬁsheries can be opened during the whole season
because the total harvest is not high enough to close the ﬁshery. By the contrary, regardless
of the number of licences, the ﬁsheries remains closed during the whole season whenever
the stock of the resource is below around 200 thousand tones. Nevertheless, there are small
areas where the optimal endogenous model implies the total closure of the ﬁshery while the
constant-escapement policy would imply its partial openness and the other way around.
Figure 4 compares the optimal solution for season lengths, harvests and escapements for
diﬀerent stocks with those implied by the constant-escapement solution (10). In particular,
we show the optimal solutions for a low number of vessels (nv = 348, panel a), for a medium
number of vessels (nv = 487, panel b) and for a high number of vessels (nv = 904, panel c).
For the harvest and the escapement, the constant-escapement solution is shown in blue doted
line. We observe that when the number of licences is small (Figure 4 panel a), the optimal
solution diﬀers from constant-escapement because the harvest associated to the steady state
solution cannot be captured with the small capacity of the ﬂeet. Because of this, from the
regulator point of view, it is optimal to allow higher harvests and maintain the ﬁshery opened

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21When the number of licensed vessels increases to a medium value (Figure 4 panel b), the
optimal rule is similar to the constant-escapement solution. The petty diﬀerences appear
because the season length is not a continuos variable because it is ﬁxed in weeks. Finally,
when the number of vessels is very high (Figure 4 panel c), the optimal rule cannot sustain
the steady state solution of constant-escapement. Even, if the ﬁshery is opened for a short
period, the ﬂeet harvests more than desirable. In this case, the optimal rule may generate
cycles: the ﬁshery is close for stocks higher than those from constant-escapement and when
it is opened the harvest is higher than constant-escapement.
The right panel of Figure 3 summaries this information. Observe that for high levels of
the stock, an increase of the number of vessel leads the regulator to close the ﬁshery although
there is no extinction risk. In the same way, for levels of the stock below but near to the
constant-escapement level, the regulator may decide not to close the ﬁshery if the number
of vessels is small.
Uncertainty from inaccurate stock estimations
When stock uncertainty arises from inaccurate stock estimations the optimal policy is
no longer constant-escapement rules (Clark and Kirkwood, 1986). Moreover, Sethi et al.
(2005) point out that “While optimal policy suggest lower escapement in the middle range,
it advocates higher escapement in the last range”. In order to verify if these results appear
in our model, we compare the optimal rules with the constant-escapement solution assuming
uncertainty about the state of the resource. Furthermore, we show how the optimal rules
depend on TACs being considered a management instrument or not.
Figure 5 mimics the results of Figure 3 but considering an uncertain scenario with respect
to the stock13. The left panel shows the results when managers do not establish TACs for
regulating the ﬁshery (regulatory body I). In the right panel, results assuming that the
ﬁshery managers establish additionally ex-ante TACs (regulatory body II) are illustrated.
Comparing the right panel in Figure 5 with Figure 3, we can see how much the results
depend on uncertainty. It is clear that the higher the uncertainty about the state of the
stock is, the lower the probability of closing the ﬁshery is (the red area increases and the
dark blue area reduces with the uncertainty). Therefore, our results are on the same line
that Sethi et al. (2005). Furthermore, comparing left panel with right panel in Figure 5, we
can see how much the results depend on TACs being considered an instrument. We observe
that using TAC as a management instrument increases the optimal season length.
13Simulations have been run assuming ǫz = 0.4050, everything else equal. In section 4.1, we explain how




































































































































the fishery is close
No season closure
(d) with TAC
Figure 5: Model with uncertain stock. Upper panel: T(Xt,1,nv|h = 7) rule. Lower panel: T
rule vs. constant-escapement rule (white dotted line)
Figure 6 compares the optimal season lengths, harvests and escapements for diﬀerent
stocks under the two types of regulatory bodies analyzed. Blue lines illustrate the regula-
tory body I (with TAC). Red lines show the regulatory body II (without TAC). In particular,
we show the optimal solutions for a low number of vessels (nv = 348, panel a), for a medium
number of vessels (nv = 487, panel b) and for a high number of vessels (nv = 904, panel
c). Notice that under uncertainty, optimal harvests and escapement are calculated in expec-
tations. Therefore, the expected values under the regulatory bodies I and II are diﬀerent































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Figure 6 highlights important ﬁndings. First, as it appears in Figure 5, the optimal
season length is higher when TACs are used as management instrument than when it is not.
And this is true for any number of vessels and for any measured stock. This is so because
when managers use TACs, the ﬁshing period may be ﬁxed larger to cover unexpected bad
ﬁshing opportunities. In the case that ﬁshing opportunities are better than expected and
vessels harvest more that expected, then the ﬁshery is closed earlier, just when the TAC is
exhausted. Second, when the number of vessels is not large (panels a) and b)), the optimal
harvest is larger and the escapement is lower without TAC than with TAC, especially for
large measured stocks. Notice that when regulators do not use TACs, season lengths are
shorter than with TACs and vessels select higher capacities to maximize future proﬁts. This














the fishery is close
trip limit = 5




















trip limit = 5
trip limit = 9
Figure 7: Eﬀects of changes in the trip limit parameter
Trip limits
Finally, we analyze how changes in the trip limit parameter vary the optimal season
length. Figure 7 illustrates the eﬀects of the changes in the parameter h over the ﬁshery
closure for diﬀerent combinations of vessels and stock. This ﬁgure is the same that the right
panel in Figure 3 but divided in two parts. The left panel of Figure 7 corresponds to the
lower part of the graph in the right panel in Figure 3 (stock from 1.5 × 105 to 3 × 105).
The right panel of Figure 7 corresponds to the upper part of the graph in the right panel in
Figure 3 (stock from 3 × 105 to 4.6 × 105).
Figure 7 shows how the boundary for seasonal closures moves when trip limit parameter


































































































Figure 8: Main variables under the Regulatory Bodies I (no TAC, red line) and II (TAC,
blue line)
varies from the benchmark value h = 7 to h = 5 and h = 9. Notice that upper movements
means that the stock has to be higher to close the ﬁshery for a given number of vessels.
Movements to the right shows that the number of vessels has to be higher to close the
ﬁshery for a given a stock. The main result is that lower trip limits imply larger season
lengths with lower probability for the ﬁshery closure.
5.2 Properties of each management regime
Once the optimal season length are obtained, we are able to compare the eﬀect of each
regimen body in biological (stock and escapement) and economic (proﬁts and welfare) terms.
In order to do this, we implement 100 times the optimal season length for each regulatory
body. Since under uncertainty, there exists risk of extinction, we run each simulation for a
26long period (1000 seasons). The experiment is run for ﬁsheries which are diﬀerent among
them by the number of licences14.
In order to select the number ol licences analyzed, we start by calculating the minimum
number of vessels that, ﬁshing every day, would generate agregate captures compatible with
the harvest of the resource analyzed. For the case of the Iberian sardine this number corre-
sponds with 348 licences. Then we run the simulations increasing the number of licences in
a 20%, 40% and so on until 180%.
In all the implementations, the initial measured stock is taken equal to the level of
constant-escapement policy in a deterministic set up (G(S∗) = 357,743 Tn). Since under
uncertainty, there exist risk of extinction, we run each simulation for a long period (1000
seasons). To discount the future we use, as Sethi et al. (2005), a discount factor equal to
0.95. We summarized the results calculating the average and the coeﬃcient of variation
(cv) for: i) the policy instruments (season length and target quotas), ii) the real stock and
escapement and, iii) the economic results: harvest, yearly proﬁts and net present value of
welfare which is equal to the product of the number of vessels by the net present value of
individual proﬁts. These average values can be considered as the mean of the stationary
distribution of the ﬁshery.
Table 4 and Figure 8 shows the average of the relevant variables for the 100 simulations
run for the two regulatory bodies and considering 10 diﬀerent numbers of licences. Red lines
illustrate the regulatory body I (without TAC). Blue lines show the regulatory body II (with
TAC). The ﬁgure highlights relevant ﬁndings. First, the higher the number of vessels is,
the lower the season length, the escapement, the harvest, individual proﬁts and the welfare,
regardless of the regulatory body. Second, the empirical simulations show that the use of
TACs along with ﬁshing periods may improve the economic variables depending on the size
of the ﬂeet. In particular, when the number of licences is small, the introduction of TACs
reduces harvest, proﬁts and welfare. However, when the ﬂeet is large using TACs along with
ﬁshing periods leads to increase both biological and economic variables.
Finally Table 5 shows the cv associated to the 100 simulations run for the two regulatory
bodies and considering 10 diﬀerent numbers of licences. Two empirical facts highlight from
the results. First, the use of TACs along with ﬁshing periods reduces de variability of all
the variables simulated for medium and high number of licences. Second, the cv is more
14The experiment has been also run for diﬀerent trip limit values. However, the results are qualitatively
similar for all the values. So, we have decided to show only the results for the benchmark parameter, h = 7
in the main text. Table 6 in the Appendix shows in detail the value of all statistics for all the cases analyzed.
27Table 4: Means (h = 7)
vessels 348 417 487 556 626 695 765 834 904 974
T season
-without TAC 364.00 364.00 290.61 251.54 167.84 154.27 85.95 79.12 50.39 48.45
-with TAC 364.00 364.00 364.00 364.00 347.11 324.87 162.56 148.46 71.36 64.79
Quota
-without TAC 129.17 131.95 112.69 104.08 98.69 98.91 100.56 97.90 107.80 105.70
-with TAC 142.93 160.25 188.50 192.01 184.35 184.71 185.99 185.19 179.51 183.78
Stock
-without TAC 396.41 364.51 318.96 310.43 300.54 300.45 299.03 297.04 303.10 298.02
-with TAC 430.19 423.41 405.98 402.35 395.55 395.33 393.88 394.68 390.13 384.41
Escapement
-without TAC 261.48 225.35 187.22 181.42 175.40 175.31 174.43 173.32 175.65 172.73
-with TAC 330.51 312.68 279.38 273.60 266.27 265.97 264.01 265.32 260.99 253.43
Harvest
-without TAC 134.94 139.15 131.74 129.01 125.14 125.14 124.60 123.72 127.45 125.29
-with TAC 99.68 110.73 126.60 128.75 129.28 129.36 129.87 129.36 129.14 130.98
Proﬁts
-without TAC 17.34 15.18 10.47 9.01 4.97 4.47 1.98 1.80 0.65 0.57
-with TAC 16.02 15.13 12.49 11.11 6.21 5.59 2.54 2.32 0.85 0.80
NP.Proﬁts
-without TAC 327.39 288.74 202.70 175.07 97.13 87.43 38.98 35.22 12.86 11.39
-with TAC 303.33 285.94 235.77 209.32 116.55 105.00 47.98 43.72 16.15 15.08
NP.Welfare
-with TAC 113829 120468 98667 97390 60788 60794 29816 29390 11628 11093
-with TAC 105461 119302 114764 116444 72941 73016 36698 36481 14600 14680
100 simulations of 1000 periods
28Table 5: C.V. (h = 7)
vessels 348 417 487 556 626 695 765 834 904 974
T season
-without TAC 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.26
-with TAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.20
Quota
-without TAC 0.07 0.03 0.34 0.45 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.64
-with TAC 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.15
Stock
-without TAC 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.33
-with TAC 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28
Escapement
-without TAC 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.26
-with TAC 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20
Harvest
-without TAC 0.60 0.66 0.86 0.94 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 0.92 1.01
-with TAC 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.55
Proﬁts
-without TAC 0.53 0.60 0.82 0.89 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.08 1.13 1.30
-with TAC 0.42 0.44 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.66
100 simulations of 1000 periods
29sensitive to changes in the number of licences when TACs are not used that when they are
used. For instance, without TACs, the cv of harvest goes from 0.60 to 1.01 depending on
the number of licences. However, with TACs, the cv of harvest goes from 0.50 to 0.55.
Note that in our model, unlike Danielsson (2002), the relative size of the uncertainty
(variance) is an endogenous variable induced by the regulatory regime. The greater the
number of vessels is, the greater the variability in the catch-eﬀort relationship relative to
the stock recruitment is, and therefore, the greater the comparative advantage of combining
harvest controls (TACs) with eﬀort controls (ﬁshing periods) is.
5.3 The ﬂeet size
As we can see in Table 4, the size of the ﬂeet is a relevant variable that aﬀect the results.
In particular, we can see that the maximum welfare is reached when the ﬂeet has a medium
size. In fact, if the regulator could select the number of licences he/she would choose to
hand over 417 vessels regardless of the regulatory body. It is worth mentioning that in both
cases, the optimal season length implies that the ﬁshery is open the whole year around.
These results do not change qualitative when the trip limit varies. Table 6 sumarizes
the welfare of the ﬁsheries for the two regulatory body assuming three diﬀerent trip limits
(h = 5,h = 7,h = 9). We mark in bold the maximum welfare under each scenario studied.
Notice that the minimum ﬂeet size (nv = 348) is never the one that leads to the maximum
welfare because the size capacity may not be enough to capture the available harvest. On
the other hand, whenever the number of licences implies the maximum welfare, it is optimal
not restricting the access to the ﬁshery (see Table 6 in the Appendix). In the ligth of these
results we may conclude that the regulator would rather select the number of licences and
do not restrict the season length.
5.4 Extinction
In a endogenous model, the risk of extinction is never associated to low levels of the stock.
When that happens, vessels do not ﬁnd proﬁtable to ﬁsh and decide not operating. Moreover,
when the stock is low enough, the regulator ﬁnds optimal to close the ﬁshery.
By the contrary, the risk of extinction may show up when the ﬁshery is characterized by
a combination of high stocks and large number of licences. The extinction risk really appears
when large measurement stocks lead vessels to participate more days and to harvest more
per day. If the ﬁshery is regulated only with ﬁshing periods, the ﬂeet may ﬁnd proﬁtable
to harvest too much in a short period of time and the stock may disappear if the number
30Table 6: Welfare and the size of the ﬂeet
vessels 348 417 487 556 626 695 765 834 904 974
h = 5
-without TAC 95.49 105.30 95.34 96.26 57.71 57.65 28.20 28.15 9.99 9.82
-with TAC 87.58 98.32 96.12 99.89 68.64 68.71 34.15 34.44 13.41 13.48
h = 7
-without TAC 113.82 120.47 98.67 97.39 60.79 60.79 29.82 29.39 11.63 11.09
-with TAC 105.46 119.30 114.76 116.44 72.94 73.02 36.70 36.48 14.60 14.68
h = 9
-without TAC 122.66 125.50 100.97 99.38 61.94 61.87 30.24 30.19 11.63 11.10
-with TAC 114.66 127.84 121.05 122.33 75.01 75.14 37.59 37.45 15.14 15.24
100 simulations of 1000 periods
of vessels is high enough. This negative eﬀect does not appear when the number of vessels
is small. However, when the ﬁshery is regulated using TAC along with ﬁshing periods, the
extinction risk disappears because once the quota is exhausted the ﬁshery is closed and the
stock is not depleted. In this sense we can say that the introduction of TACs as management
instrument avoids the risk of extinction.




































































(a) h = 5




































































(b) h = 7




































































(c) h = 9
Figure 9: Risk of Extinction. Probabiity S < X
Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between the measured stock and the probability of
the ex post escapement to be below the stock. Red lines illustrate the relationship under
regulatory body I (without TAC). Blue lines show it under the regulatory body II (with
TAC). We highlight the following results: i) The probability that the escapement is below









































Figure 10: Risk of Extinction for Large Fleets
the stock is always higher when TACs are not used as management instrument. ii) When
the stock is high enough the probability that the escapement is below the stock is one
and therefore extinction is sure. iii) When the stock is low, there is not risk of extinction
regardless of the regulatory body considered.
These results can be also appreciated in Figure 10. This ﬁgure illustrates the evolution
of the stock along the 1000 periods simulated under regulatory body I (without TAC, upper
panel) and under regulatory body II (with TAC, low panel) for the case of a large ﬂeet.
Each color shows a particular simulation. We can see that without TACs, in many
simulations the stock drops to zero level and extinction becomes real. However, with TAC,
this situation never happens.
6 Conclusions
We develop an endogenous regulated restricted access ﬁshery management model with mul-
tiple inputs that builds upon Homans and Wilen (1997) and Anderson (2000). We assume
32ﬁshery manager can use simultaneously daily quotas (or trip limits), ﬁshing periods (the
overall limits on the ﬁshing season) and total allowed quotas for achieving the target har-
vest. As in Clark and Kirkwood (1986), we assume that when ﬁshery manager chooses
quotas he does not know the real state of the stock. Following Arnason (2000), we solve
numerically the ﬁshery management problem taking into account that individual agents’
behavior is generated by endogenous optimization. This endogenous optimization problem
is applied to the Iberian sardine stock. Simulations show relevant conclusions.
With respect to uncertainty, we found that higher levels of uncertainty about the state
of the stock reduce the likelihood of closing the ﬁshery. Therefore, our result is on the same
line that as Sethi et al. (2005).
The use of TACs as management instrument in ﬁsheries already regulated with ﬁshing
periods leads to larger optimal season lengths and harvests, especially for medium and high
number of licences. However, its eﬀect over the economic variables depends on the size of
the ﬂeet. In particular, when the number of licences is small, the introduction of TACs
reduces harvest, proﬁts and welfare. However, when the ﬂeet is large using TACs leads
to increase all biological and economic variables. Moreover, the introduction of TACs as
management instrument avoids the risk of extinction. The risk of extinction appears in
our model whenever the ﬁshery is characterized by a combination of high stocks and large
number of licences. Large measurement stocks lead vessels to participate more days and to
harvest more per day. If the ﬁshery is regulated only with ﬁshing periods, the ﬂeet may ﬁnd
proﬁtable to harvest too much in a short period of time and the stock may disappear if the
number of vessels is high enough. However, when the ﬁshery is regulated using TAC along
with ﬁshing periods, the extinction risk disappears because once the quota is exhausted the
ﬁshery is closed and the stock is not depleted.
When we focus on welfare, we ﬁnd that from the regulator point of view, it would be
better selecting the number of licences and do not restrict the season length. Therefore a
interesting issue to be analyzed in future research is how this optimal number of licenses
is achieving given the initial situation of the ﬂeet. In fact some studies suggest that in
many stocks there is excess capacity (Lazkano, 2008). Moreover, given that technical change
exacerbates excess ﬁshing capacity and low returns to ﬁshing eﬀort and investment (see
Kirkley et al., 2004 ), the optimal number of licensees is a endogenous variable that depends
on the technical change growth rate.
Another interesting regulation question to be addressed would be the role of the mesh
size regulations and/or how to share the TAC between diﬀerent gear. Diekert et al. (2010)
suggest that some commercial ﬁsheries are wasting a large part of its potential rather a too
33small mesh size than excessive eﬀort. Our model could be extended by introducing more
realistic age structured resource dynamics, as Tahvonen (2009) and Bjørndal et al. (2004),
to study the eﬀects of changes in mesh sizes by using the methods developed in Da Rocha
et al. (2010) and Da Rocha and Gutierrez (2010).
References
[1] Anderson, L.G., (2000). “Open Access Fisheries Utilization with an Endogenous Regu-
latory Structure: An Expanded Analysis”. Annals of Operations Research 94, 231-257.
[2] Arnasson, R., (2000). “Endogenous optimization ﬁsheries models”. Annals of Operations
Research 94, 219-230.
[3] Bjørndal, T., Gordon, D.V., Kaitala, V. and M. Lindroos, (2004). “International Man-
agement Strategies for a Straddling Fish Stock: A Bio-Economic Simulation Model of
the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery”. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 29(4), 435-457.
[4] Clark, G.W. and P.G. Kirkwood, (1986). “On Uncertain Renewable Resource Stocks:
Optimal Harvest Policies and the Value of Stock Surveys”. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 13(3), 235-244.
[5] Council Regulation (EC) No 1288/2009 of 27 November 2009 Establishig Transitional
Technical Measures from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2011.
[6] Da Rocha, J.M., Cervi˜ no, S. and M.J. Guti´ errez, (2010), “An Endogenous Bio-economic
Optimization Algorithm to Evaluate Recovery Plans: an Application to Southern
Hake”. ICES, Journal of Marine Science 67(9), 1957-1962.
[7] Da Rocha, J.M. and M.J. Guti´ errez, (2010), “Reference Points as the Steady State
Solution of a Dynamic Optimal Management Problem for Multi-species Age-structured
Fisheries”. Mimeo.
[8] Danielsson, A., (2002). “Eﬃciency of Catch and Eﬀort Quotas in the Presence of Risk”.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 20-33.
[9] Diekert, F.K., Hjermann, D. O. and E. Naevdal, (2010). “Spare the Young Fish: Op-
timal Harvesting Policies for North-East Arctic Cod”. Environmental and Resource
Economics 47, 455-475.
[10] Hannesson, R. and S. Steinshamn, (1991). “How to Set Catch Quotas: Constant Eﬀort
or Constant Catch”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 71-91.
34[11] Homans, F. R. and J.E. Wilen, (1997). “A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource
Use”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32, 1-21.
[12] ICES. 2007. Report of the Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mack-
erel, Sardine and Anchovy (WGMHSA), 4 - 13 September 2007, ICES Headquarters.
ICES CM 2007/ACFM:31. 712 pp.
[13] IPHC, 2009. Anual Report. ISSN: 0074-7238.http://www.iphc.washington.edu/publications/
annual/ar2009.pdf
[14] Kirkley, C. J., Morrison, P., Cunningham, S. and J. Catanzano, (2004). “Embodied and
Disembodied Technical Change in Fisheries: An Analysis of the S` ete Trawl Fishery,
1985-1999 ”. Environmental and Resource Economics 29(2), 191-217.
[15] Kompas, T., Tuong, N.C. and R. Quentin, (2008). “Fisheries Instrument Choice under
Uncertainty”. Land Economics 84(4), 652-666.
[16] Lazkano, I. (2008). “Cost Structure and Capacity Utilisation in Multi-product Indus-
tries: An Application to the Basque Trawl Industry”. Environmental and Resource
Economics 41(2), 189-207.
[17] Pesca Galicia. http://www.pescagalicia.com/
[18] Quiggin, J., (1992). “How to Set Catch Quotas: a Note on the Superiority of Constant
Eﬀort Rules”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22(2), 199–203.
[19] Reed, W.J., (1979). “Optimal Escapement Levels in Stochastic and Deterministic Har-
vesting Models. ”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 6, 350-363.
[20] Sethi, G., Costello, C., Fisher, A., Hanemann, M. and L. Karp, (2005). “Fishery Man-
agement under Multiple Uncertainty”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 50, 300-318.
[21] Suris, J., (1993). “Regulation of the Iberoatlantic Sardine Fishery”. Environmental and
Resource Economics 3(5), 457-470.
[22] Tahvonen, O. 2009. “Economics of Harvesting Age-structured Fish Populations”. Jour-
nal of Environmental Economics and Management 58, 281-299
35T
a
b
l
e
7
:
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
s
n
v
e
s
s
e
l
s
3
4
7
.
6
8
3
4
7
.
6
8
4
1
7
.
2
2
4
1
7
.
2
2
4
8
6
.
7
6
4
8
6
.
7
6
5
5
6
.
2
9
5
5
6
.
2
9
6
2
5
.
8
3
6
2
5
.
8
3
6
9
5
.
3
7
6
9
5
.
3
7
7
6
4
.
9
0
7
6
4
.
9
0
8
3
4
.
4
4
8
3
4
.
4
4
9
0
3
.
9
8
9
0
3
.
9
8
9
7
3
.
5
1
9
7
3
.
5
1
h
=
5
T
A
C
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
T
s
e
a
s
o
n
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
3
.
8
6
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
5
0
.
1
1
3
6
4
.
0
0
1
7
9
.
8
4
3
5
7
.
7
4
1
6
4
.
7
2
3
3
7
.
9
5
8
8
.
9
7
1
7
1
.
0
4
8
5
.
3
5
1
5
6
.
7
6
5
0
.
3
2
7
9
.
2
2
7
.
5
2
7
0
.
4
3
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
9
0
.
0
4
0
.
3
8
0
.
0
7
0
.
3
3
0
.
1
1
0
.
3
3
0
.
1
3
0
.
2
5
0
.
1
3
3
.
9
9
0
.
2
0
Q
u
o
t
a
1
2
3
.
6
1
1
2
9
.
5
8
1
3
1
.
1
9
1
4
2
.
7
6
1
3
2
.
6
7
1
6
6
.
9
0
1
2
5
.
6
5
1
7
1
.
2
5
9
9
.
1
5
1
8
4
.
1
1
9
9
.
3
0
1
8
4
.
1
5
9
8
.
6
4
1
8
3
.
1
0
1
0
0
.
7
4
1
8
5
.
8
9
1
0
4
.
8
3
1
7
2
.
8
7
1
6
.
6
4
1
7
7
.
8
0
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
6
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
7
0
.
1
1
0
.
5
3
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
2
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
4
0
.
2
0
0
.
5
4
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
0
0
.
1
3
4
.
3
3
0
.
1
4
S
t
o
c
k
4
1
4
.
3
9
4
3
2
.
5
8
3
9
3
.
6
7
4
2
6
.
9
4
3
4
6
.
1
0
4
1
1
.
3
3
3
3
3
.
7
2
4
0
5
.
0
7
3
0
1
.
0
3
3
9
3
.
9
6
3
0
1
.
1
1
3
9
3
.
9
3
2
9
9
.
2
3
3
9
3
.
6
1
3
0
0
.
1
6
3
9
1
.
6
3
2
8
3
.
1
8
3
9
5
.
3
7
4
4
.
4
0
3
8
9
.
3
9
c
.
v
.
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
4
2
0
.
2
7
4
.
1
1
0
.
2
8
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
2
9
0
.
4
2
3
4
1
.
0
9
2
5
9
.
1
7
3
2
5
.
2
4
2
0
8
.
5
6
2
9
2
.
3
1
1
9
8
.
4
0
2
8
2
.
2
8
1
7
5
.
2
9
2
6
4
.
6
0
1
7
5
.
3
6
2
6
4
.
5
7
1
7
4
.
1
0
2
6
4
.
4
3
1
7
4
.
6
8
2
6
1
.
5
5
1
6
4
.
3
6
2
6
9
.
2
1
2
5
.
6
2
2
6
0
.
7
5
c
.
v
.
0
.
1
6
0
.
2
2
0
.
1
2
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
6
0
.
2
1
0
.
1
1
0
.
2
1
0
.
2
6
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
6
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
7
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
7
0
.
1
9
0
.
3
6
0
.
2
2
4
.
1
2
0
.
2
1
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
1
2
3
.
9
7
9
1
.
4
9
1
3
4
.
5
0
1
0
1
.
6
9
1
3
7
.
5
3
1
1
9
.
0
2
1
3
5
.
3
2
1
2
2
.
7
8
1
2
5
.
7
4
1
2
9
.
3
6
1
2
5
.
7
5
1
2
9
.
3
6
1
2
5
.
1
3
1
2
9
.
1
9
1
2
5
.
4
8
1
3
0
.
0
8
1
1
8
.
8
2
1
2
6
.
1
6
1
8
.
7
9
1
2
8
.
6
3
c
.
v
.
0
.
5
4
0
.
4
8
0
.
5
7
0
.
4
7
0
.
7
1
0
.
4
9
0
.
7
6
0
.
5
0
1
.
0
2
0
.
5
6
1
.
0
2
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
3
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
3
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
3
0
.
5
0
5
.
4
9
0
.
5
2
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
1
4
.
5
5
1
3
.
3
2
1
3
.
3
9
1
2
.
4
5
1
0
.
2
2
1
0
.
4
5
8
.
9
8
9
.
4
9
4
.
7
2
5
.
8
0
4
.
2
4
5
.
2
3
1
.
8
8
2
.
3
6
1
.
7
2
2
.
1
8
0
.
5
5
0
.
7
9
0
.
0
8
0
.
7
3
c
.
v
.
0
.
4
5
0
.
3
7
0
.
4
8
0
.
3
7
0
.
6
3
0
.
4
5
0
.
7
0
0
.
4
8
0
.
9
8
0
.
5
7
0
.
9
8
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
2
0
.
5
8
1
.
0
3
0
.
5
8
1
.
2
8
0
.
5
7
6
.
0
8
0
.
6
2
N
P
.
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
2
7
4
.
6
5
2
5
1
.
9
0
2
5
3
.
4
1
2
3
5
.
6
5
1
9
5
.
8
6
1
9
7
.
4
7
1
7
3
.
0
4
1
7
9
.
5
6
9
2
.
2
2
1
0
9
.
6
7
8
2
.
9
1
9
8
.
8
1
3
6
.
8
7
4
4
.
6
5
3
3
.
7
3
4
1
.
2
7
1
1
.
0
5
1
4
.
8
3
1
0
.
0
9
1
3
.
8
4
N
P
.
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
9
5
.
4
9
8
7
.
5
8
1
0
5
.
7
3
9
8
.
3
2
9
5
.
3
4
9
6
.
1
2
9
6
.
2
6
9
9
.
8
9
5
7
.
7
1
6
8
.
6
4
5
7
.
6
5
6
8
.
7
1
2
8
.
2
0
3
4
.
1
5
2
8
.
1
5
3
4
.
4
4
9
.
9
9
1
3
.
4
1
9
.
8
2
1
3
.
4
8
E
x
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
h
=
7
T
A
C
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
T
s
e
a
s
o
n
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
2
9
0
.
4
4
3
6
4
.
0
0
2
5
1
.
5
6
3
6
4
.
0
0
1
6
7
.
3
0
3
4
6
.
9
3
1
5
3
.
5
4
3
2
4
.
7
9
8
5
.
5
3
1
6
2
.
5
0
7
8
.
9
3
1
4
8
.
3
7
4
8
.
2
2
7
1
.
4
3
4
8
.
3
9
6
4
.
7
9
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
1
6
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
7
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
9
0
.
0
6
0
.
3
8
0
.
0
9
0
.
3
4
0
.
1
2
0
.
3
3
0
.
1
0
0
.
3
2
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
0
Q
u
o
t
a
1
2
9
.
1
3
1
4
2
.
9
2
1
3
1
.
9
5
1
6
0
.
2
4
1
1
2
.
5
5
1
8
8
.
4
3
1
0
3
.
8
6
1
9
1
.
9
2
9
8
.
1
2
1
8
4
.
1
2
9
8
.
1
5
1
8
4
.
4
6
9
9
.
6
8
1
8
5
.
7
9
9
7
.
4
1
1
8
4
.
9
0
1
0
3
.
2
8
1
7
9
.
3
6
1
0
5
.
1
7
1
8
3
.
6
5
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
9
0
.
3
4
0
.
1
0
0
.
4
5
0
.
1
4
0
.
5
4
0
.
1
8
0
.
5
3
0
.
1
8
0
.
5
6
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
7
0
.
1
6
0
.
6
2
0
.
1
4
0
.
6
4
0
.
1
5
S
t
o
c
k
3
9
6
.
1
0
4
2
9
.
8
8
3
6
4
.
3
1
4
2
3
.
0
8
3
1
8
.
7
7
4
0
5
.
5
1
3
1
0
.
2
7
4
0
1
.
8
6
3
0
0
.
1
6
3
9
4
.
9
8
2
9
9
.
9
4
3
9
4
.
7
8
2
9
8
.
5
5
3
9
3
.
3
4
2
9
7
.
0
3
3
9
4
.
0
3
2
8
9
.
5
5
3
8
9
.
5
9
2
9
7
.
5
6
3
8
3
.
8
7
c
.
v
.
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
9
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
1
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
5
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
4
0
0
.
2
8
0
.
3
3
0
.
2
8
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
2
6
1
.
3
6
3
3
0
.
2
0
2
2
5
.
3
5
3
1
2
.
4
0
1
8
7
.
1
3
2
7
9
.
0
3
1
8
1
.
2
6
2
7
3
.
2
6
1
7
4
.
9
4
2
6
5
.
9
0
1
7
4
.
7
3
2
6
5
.
5
9
1
7
3
.
8
6
2
6
3
.
6
7
1
7
3
.
0
4
2
6
4
.
8
8
1
6
7
.
7
7
2
6
0
.
5
8
1
7
2
.
4
0
2
5
3
.
0
7
c
.
v
.
0
.
1
0
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
3
0
.
2
0
0
.
1
7
0
.
1
7
0
.
2
1
0
.
1
7
0
.
2
7
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
7
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
8
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
9
0
.
1
9
0
.
3
2
0
.
2
1
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
0
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
1
3
4
.
7
5
9
9
.
6
8
1
3
8
.
9
6
1
1
0
.
6
8
1
3
1
.
6
4
1
2
6
.
4
8
1
2
9
.
0
0
1
2
8
.
5
9
1
2
5
.
2
2
1
2
9
.
0
9
1
2
5
.
2
2
1
2
9
.
1
9
1
2
4
.
6
9
1
2
9
.
6
7
1
2
3
.
9
9
1
2
9
.
1
5
1
2
1
.
7
8
1
2
9
.
0
1
1
2
5
.
1
6
1
3
0
.
8
1
c
.
v
.
0
.
6
0
0
.
5
0
0
.
6
5
0
.
5
1
0
.
8
6
0
.
5
5
0
.
9
4
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
4
0
.
5
6
1
.
0
4
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
6
1
.
0
2
0
.
5
2
1
.
0
0
0
.
5
5
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
1
7
.
3
2
1
6
.
0
2
1
5
.
1
6
1
5
.
1
2
1
0
.
4
6
1
2
.
4
9
9
.
0
1
1
1
.
1
0
4
.
9
7
6
.
1
9
4
.
4
7
5
.
5
8
1
.
9
9
2
.
5
4
1
.
8
0
2
.
3
1
0
.
6
2
0
.
8
5
0
.
5
7
0
.
7
9
c
.
v
.
0
.
5
3
0
.
4
2
0
.
6
0
0
.
4
4
0
.
8
2
0
.
5
3
0
.
8
9
0
.
5
6
1
.
0
1
0
.
5
9
1
.
0
1
0
.
5
9
1
.
0
6
0
.
6
0
1
.
0
8
0
.
6
0
1
.
2
4
0
.
6
2
1
.
3
0
0
.
6
7
N
P
.
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
3
2
7
.
5
2
3
0
2
.
6
6
2
8
8
.
6
3
2
8
5
.
4
5
2
0
2
.
6
7
2
3
5
.
5
7
1
7
5
.
0
8
2
0
9
.
2
8
9
7
.
1
6
1
1
6
.
7
9
8
7
.
4
3
1
0
5
.
1
7
3
8
.
8
8
4
7
.
9
3
3
5
.
2
9
4
3
.
6
8
1
2
.
7
9
1
6
.
1
0
1
1
.
3
4
1
5
.
0
6
N
P
.
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
1
1
3
.
8
7
1
0
5
.
2
3
1
2
0
.
4
2
1
1
9
.
1
0
9
8
.
6
5
1
1
4
.
6
6
9
7
.
4
0
1
1
6
.
4
2
6
0
.
8
0
7
3
.
0
9
6
0
.
8
0
7
3
.
1
3
2
9
.
7
4
3
6
.
6
6
2
9
.
4
5
3
6
.
4
5
1
1
.
5
6
1
4
.
5
5
1
1
.
0
4
1
4
.
6
6
E
x
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
h
=
9
T
A
C
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
T
s
e
a
s
o
n
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
3
6
4
.
0
0
2
6
8
.
9
7
3
6
4
.
0
0
2
3
1
.
6
8
3
6
4
.
0
0
1
6
3
.
6
0
3
4
3
.
5
6
1
4
7
.
3
6
3
2
0
.
8
7
8
3
.
2
2
1
5
7
.
9
6
7
7
.
0
2
1
4
7
.
2
8
4
9
.
5
4
6
8
.
6
3
4
7
.
4
9
6
3
.
5
6
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
4
0
0
.
0
6
0
.
3
9
0
.
1
0
0
.
3
4
0
.
1
2
0
.
3
2
0
.
1
0
0
.
2
4
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
0
Q
u
o
t
a
1
2
8
.
7
1
1
4
8
.
2
2
1
2
9
.
4
3
1
6
5
.
0
7
1
0
7
.
9
7
1
9
1
.
2
0
1
0
1
.
3
9
1
9
3
.
6
5
9
7
.
9
7
1
8
4
.
4
1
9
6
.
6
6
1
8
4
.
7
2
9
8
.
5
0
1
8
5
.
3
1
9
6
.
3
9
1
8
5
.
7
8
1
0
6
.
2
4
1
8
1
.
7
1
1
0
2
.
6
0
1
8
5
.
5
9
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
9
0
.
4
1
0
.
1
2
0
.
5
0
0
.
1
4
0
.
5
4
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
5
0
.
1
9
0
.
5
7
0
.
1
8
0
.
5
6
0
.
1
8
0
.
5
8
0
.
1
5
0
.
6
9
0
.
1
5
S
t
o
c
k
3
8
3
.
9
3
4
2
7
.
0
5
3
5
2
.
2
2
4
2
0
.
3
0
3
1
4
.
2
8
4
0
5
.
3
8
3
0
7
.
1
0
4
0
2
.
4
9
2
9
9
.
3
6
3
9
5
.
6
6
2
9
9
.
0
6
3
9
5
.
3
7
2
9
6
.
7
5
3
9
4
.
2
3
2
9
6
.
6
7
3
9
3
.
8
8
2
9
9
.
3
3
3
8
7
.
5
2
2
9
2
.
5
2
3
8
1
.
7
4
c
.
v
.
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
2
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
0
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
2
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
5
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
5
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
6
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
2
0
.
2
8
0
.
3
4
0
.
2
8
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
2
4
6
.
1
8
3
2
2
.
8
6
2
1
4
.
0
8
3
0
6
.
2
1
1
8
4
.
0
7
2
7
8
.
2
2
1
7
9
.
4
4
2
7
3
.
7
8
1
7
4
.
5
1
2
6
6
.
6
8
1
7
4
.
3
0
2
6
6
.
2
6
1
7
2
.
8
6
2
6
4
.
9
3
1
7
2
.
7
6
2
6
4
.
4
7
1
7
3
.
3
9
2
5
7
.
6
2
1
6
9
.
1
1
2
5
0
.
2
7
c
.
v
.
0
.
0
6
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
0
0
.
1
7
0
.
2
4
0
.
1
6
0
.
2
8
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
8
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
9
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
9
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
8
0
.
2
0
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
1
3
7
.
7
5
1
0
4
.
1
8
1
3
8
.
1
4
1
1
4
.
1
0
1
3
0
.
2
2
1
2
7
.
1
5
1
2
7
.
6
6
1
2
8
.
7
1
1
2
4
.
8
4
1
2
8
.
9
8
1
2
4
.
7
5
1
2
9
.
1
1
1
2
3
.
8
9
1
2
9
.
3
0
1
2
3
.
9
2
1
2
9
.
4
1
1
2
5
.
9
4
1
2
9
.
9
0
1
2
3
.
4
0
1
3
1
.
4
8
c
.
v
.
0
.
6
4
0
.
5
0
0
.
7
0
0
.
5
2
0
.
9
1
0
.
5
7
0
.
9
9
0
.
5
8
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
6
0
.
5
7
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
7
0
.
9
8
0
.
5
3
1
.
0
5
0
.
5
6
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
1
8
.
6
4
1
7
.
4
9
1
5
.
7
5
1
6
.
2
6
1
0
.
6
9
1
3
.
2
1
9
.
1
8
1
1
.
6
8
5
.
0
7
6
.
3
6
4
.
5
5
5
.
7
3
2
.
0
2
2
.
6
0
1
.
8
4
2
.
3
9
0
.
6
5
0
.
8
9
0
.
5
7
0
.
8
3
c
.
v
.
0
.
5
9
0
.
4
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
4
8
0
.
8
8
0
.
5
6
0
.
9
6
0
.
5
8
1
.
0
3
0
.
6
1
1
.
0
4
0
.
6
1
1
.
0
8
0
.
6
1
1
.
0
8
0
.
6
1
1
.
2
2
0
.
6
5
1
.
3
7
0
.
6
9
N
P
.
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
3
5
2
.
8
0
3
2
9
.
7
7
3
0
0
.
8
0
3
0
6
.
4
2
2
0
7
.
4
3
2
4
8
.
6
8
1
7
8
.
6
5
2
1
9
.
9
0
9
8
.
9
7
1
1
9
.
8
6
8
8
.
9
8
1
0
8
.
0
6
3
9
.
5
4
4
9
.
1
4
3
6
.
1
8
4
4
.
8
8
1
2
.
8
7
1
6
.
7
5
1
1
.
4
0
1
5
.
6
6
N
P
.
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
1
2
2
.
6
6
1
1
4
.
6
6
1
2
5
.
5
0
1
2
7
.
8
4
1
0
0
.
9
7
1
2
1
.
0
5
9
9
.
3
8
1
2
2
.
3
3
6
1
.
9
4
7
5
.
0
1
6
1
.
8
7
7
5
.
1
4
3
0
.
2
4
3
7
.
5
9
3
0
.
1
9
3
7
.
4
5
1
1
.
6
3
1
5
.
1
4
1
1
.
1
0
1
5
.
2
4
E
x
t
i
n
c
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
0
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
1
0
0
0
p
e
r
i
o
d
s0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
3
4
8
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
4
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
4
1
7
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
4
8
7
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
5
5
6
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
6
2
6
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
6
9
5
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
7
6
5
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
8
3
4
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
2
0
4
0
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
)
n
v
=
9
0
4
 
a
n
d
 
h
m
a
x
=
7
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
H
a
r
v
e
s
t
0
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
3
3
.
5
4
4
.
5
5
x
 
1
0
5
0
1
2
3
x
 
1
0
5
S
t
o
c
k
E
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
B
e
s
t
F
r
e
e
 
e
s
c
a
p
e
m
e
n
t
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
1
:
S
l
i
d
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
T
(
X
t
,
1
,
n
v
|
h
=
7
)
r
u
l
e
f
o
r
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
v
e
s
s
e
l
s
.
37